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Last year’s sharp drop in the capital ratios of bank holding companies could cast doubt on the
companies’future capital strength, especially if credit quality eroded significantly or if profitability
weakened. However, an analysis linking the drop in ratios to bank efforts to increase shareholder
payouts in a period of strong profitability suggests that these concerns are premature.
and as a share of net income. In fact, among the twenty-
five largest U.S. bank holding companies—all of which
had assets of $45 billion or more—shareholder payouts
exceeded net income on average for the group.
Such high shareholder payouts might be seen as a
threat to banking institutions’ capital strength if profit-
ability faltered. However, we find that the sharp rise in
shareholder payouts during 1997 appears to have been
driven primarily by increases in net stock repurchases
rather than by a run-up in dividend payments. The compo-
sition of these payouts is important because banking com-
panies can cut back on repurchases more easily than they
can reduce dividend payments if earnings begin to drop.
For this reason, the recent increase in overall shareholder




U.S. banks and bank holding companies are subject to
three regulatory capital ratios that together are intended
to gauge their capital strength. Each ratio has a measure
of regulatory capital in the numerator and a measure of
the extent of the institution’s activities in the denominator.
Two different measures of regulatory capital are used in
calculating the ratios: tier 1 capital, which consists primarily
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Bank holding companies have significantly increased
their capital ratios since the late 1980s and early 1990s,
when losses from real estate and other troubled lending
sectors precipitated a wave of bank failures. Nearly all
banking institutions now have capital ratios that com-
fortably exceed regulatory minimums. In large part,
these ratios reflect a string of highly profitable years in
which banks retained a significant portion of their earn-
ings while increasing payouts to shareholders.
During 1997, however, average capital ratios at U.S.
banking institutions declined, particularly among the
largest bank holding companies. These declines raise the
question, Could banking institutions face future capital
constraints, particularly if their credit quality were to
deteriorate significantly or if profitability were otherwise
to weaken? In the extreme, such constraints could under-
mine banks’ability to expand their lending activities or to
participate fully in other key financial services.
In this edition of Current Issues, we assess the serious-
ness of these concerns by examining the reasons for the
decrease in bank holding company capital ratios in 1997.
We find that the decrease is attributable to banking insti-
tutions’ efforts to increase payouts to shareholders in an
environment of strong profitability. These payouts—in
the form of dividend payments and net stock repur-
chases—grew dramatically in 1997, both in dollar termsof “core capital” elements such as common stock and
certain forms of preferred stock, and total capital, which
consists of tier 1 capital plus “supplementary” (tier 2)
capital elements such as subordinated debt.1
The first two ratios are the tier 1 and total capital
ratios, which are calculated as the ratios of tier 1 and total
capital to an institution’s risk-weighted assets. By incor-
porating risk-weighted assets, these ratios are designed to
measure a bank’s capital relative to its risk exposure. As a
result, the ratios are frequently referred to as a bank’s
“risk-based capital ratios.” In contrast, the third capital
ratio—the leverage ratio—is intended to provide a measure
of a bank’s capital resources relative to a measure of the
scale of its overall activities without any adjustment for
risk. This ratio is calculated as tier 1 capital divided by
average total assets. To meet minimum capital require-
ments, bank holding companies must maintain tier 1
capital ratios exceeding 4 percent, total capital ratios
above 8 percent, and leverage ratios in excess of 3 percent.2
1997 Capital Ratios
At the close of 1997, average capital ratios for all U.S.
bank holding companies were well above the minimum
regulatory capital requirements. The average tier 1 cap-
ital, total capital, and leverage ratios were 9.0 percent,
12.5 percent, and 7.1 percent, respectively. Despite end-
ing the year at comparatively high levels, however, the
average capital ratios had fallen markedly during 1997.
These falls continued a slight downward trend that
began in the mid-1990s, although the decreases in the
ratios were noticeably larger in 1997 than in earlier
years. By year-end, the average tier 1 and total capital
ratios for all U.S. bank holding companies had declined
about 50 basis points from their end-of-1996 levels.
These drops were even more pronounced among the
twenty-five largest U.S. bank holding companies,
whose average tier 1 and total capital ratios had
decreased by 62 and 69 basis points, respectively (Chart 1).3
For both sets of institutions, the decline in the average
leverage ratio was less pronounced; it essentially
reversed an upturn in 1996 and returned these ratios to
the levels that had prevailed in the mid-1990s.
For many observers, any such slides in the risk-based
capital ratios could be a troubling development, a sign
that U.S. banking companies are likely to face capital con-
straints if profitability deteriorates. Conventional wisdom
holds that banks should build up capital ratios during
periods of high profitability to have a strong capital base
that can withstand inevitable future downturns. Indeed,
U.S. banking companies have made a serious effort in the
past several years to build up capital ratios following the
period of industry turmoil in the late 1980s and early
1990s. But the view that the 1997 drop in capital ratios
represents a potentially alarming weakening of banks’
capital bases is only one possible interpretation. We might
also see the drop as a strategic move by banks to manage
their capital positions in the wake of several years of high
profitability and the resultant buildup in capital.
To determine which interpretation best fits the evi-
dence, we examine the relationship between the size of
the decline in the risk-based capital ratios and the initial
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Chart 1
Annual Change in Large Bank Holding Companies’ 
Average Capital Ratios 
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Notes:  Ratios are for the twenty-five largest U.S. bank holding companies at the
end of 1997 (with assets of $45 billion or more at that time). The tier 1 and total
capital ratios are calculated as the ratios of tier 1 and total capital to an insti-
tution’s risk-weighted assets; the leverage ratio is calculated as tier 1 capital
divided by average total assets. The figures above the bars indicate the basis 
point changes in the ratios from the previous year. Data are as of year-end and
have been adjusted to control for mergers.3
level of those ratios for the twenty-five largest U.S.
bank holding companies. Chart 2 presents a scatterplot
of the year-end 1996 total capital ratio against the 1997
change in the ratio; the downward-sloping line in the
chart is the estimated regression line between the two
variables. As the regression line indicates, there is a
negative relationship between the initial level of the
total capital ratio and the subsequent drop in the ratio,
suggesting that bank holding companies with higher
capital ratios at the end of 1996 tended to have larger
declines in those ratios during 1997.4 While there is sig-
nificant variation among the twenty-five bank holding
companies in the sample, the overall relationship is con-
sistent with the idea that these institutions were
attempting to move their capital ratios toward some
relatively similar target level. That is, we would expect
to see a negative relationship between capital ratio levels
and subsequent changes if banking companies were
actively managing their capital ratios around a target
level determined by market forces or by their desire not
to deviate from a peer group standard.
Composition of Bank Holding Companies’
1997 Changes in Capital Positions
Bank holding companies appear to be actively manag-
ing their capital ratios. How, then, are they accomplish-
ing this objective? We can develop some insight into this
issue through a closer examination of the mechanics
behind the decrease in regulatory capital ratios for the
twenty-five largest U.S. bank holding companies (see
table). The first thing to note is that the drop in capital
ratios during 1997 was not fueled by an outright fall in
the tier 1 and total capital holdings of these institutions.
Both regulatory capital measures increased slightly,
though at considerably slower rates than in the three
preceding years. These slower than average growth rates
contrast sharply with the growth rates of risk-weighted
assets and average total assets, both of which rose at
rates more in line with those in 1994-96 (though near
the high end of this range). Taken together, these fig-
ures suggest that the decline in regulatory capital ratios
in 1997 reflected an unusual slowdown in the growth of
capital holdings more than an unusual increase in total
or risk-weighted assets.
Further insight into the issue of capital management is
provided by Chart 3, which breaks down the change in
bank holding companies’ equity capital positions into its
various components. Note that equity capital does not
precisely correspond to the definition of tier 1 capital
used for regulatory capital purposes, though there is con-
siderable overlap between the two concepts.5 We examine
equity capital here because detailed information about the
sources of change in equity capital is provided in bank
holding companies’regulatory reports.
The chart divides the overall change in equity capital
from year-end 1996 to year-end 1997 into two broad com-
ponents. The first is contributions from operating activi-
ties (net income and unrealized gains on available-for-sale
securities), reflecting basic profitability; the second is
shareholder payouts (net issuance of common and pre-
ferred stock, net change in treasury stock, and dividend
payments), which reflect ways that earnings can be trans-
ferred to shareholders.
Chart 2
1997 Change in Large Bank Holding Companies’
Total Capital Ratio 
1997 change in ratio
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Notes:  The chart plots the relationship between the year-end 1996 total capital 
ratio and the 1997 change in the ratio. It suggests that bank holding companies 
with higher capital ratios at the end of 1996 had sharper declines in those ratios 
in 1997. Data are for the twenty-five largest U.S. bank holding companies at the
end of 1997 (with assets of $45 billion or more at that time). Year-end capital
ratios for 1996 have been adjusted to control for mergers.
Growth from Prior Year in Large Bank Holding Companies’
Capital, Risk-Weighted Assets, and Total Assets
Percentage Change
Tier 1 Total Risk-Weighted Average
Year Capital Capital Assets Total Assets
1997 1.56 3.58 9.55 8.41
1996 9.83 10.13 7.27 3.22
1995 5.92 6.56 10.22 6.95
1994 5.94 5.44 7.54 8.81
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, “Consolidated
Financial Statements for Bank Holding Companies—FR Y-9C.”
Notes: Data are for the twenty-five largest U.S. bank holding companies (with
assets of $45 billion or more). Data have been adjusted to control for mergers.Since shareholder payouts are the focus of our analy-
sis, we consider in more detail how these transactions
allow institutions to pass on their earnings. Dividend pay-
ments are direct cash distributions of earnings to share-
holders. Net issuance of common and preferred stock is
the difference between new stock issued and stock retired;
this difference reflects the net change in the total volume
of a bank holding company’s common and preferred
stock. The total volume of stock, in turn, can be divided
into two segments: the portion held by shareholders
(issued and outstanding stock) and the portion repur-
chased from shareholders by the bank holding company
(treasury stock). Repurchased stock may be held by the
bank as treasury stock or retired. Bank holding companies
often repurchase stock in order to distribute earnings to
shareholders without altering dividends or exposing
shareholders to the taxes due on dividend payments. Net
issuance of common and preferred stock plus the net change
in treasury stock represents the total net amount of earnings
returned to shareholders through stock repurchases.
In 1997, a sizable portion of bank holding company
earnings was paid to shareholders as dividends and stock
repurchases (Chart 3). Significantly, although the dollar
value of the twenty-five largest bank holding companies’
dividend payments increased about 5 percent from 1996
levels, the dollar value of the companies’ stock repur-
chases surged—rising by nearly 70 percent. As a result,
aggregate shareholder payouts by these institutions
exceeded net income by more than 10 percent in 1997.
This was the first time that these institutions paid out more
than they earned during the highly profitable period begin-
ning in the mid-1990s. While the pattern for individual
institutions varied, fifteen of the twenty-five largest made
shareholder payouts that exceeded net income during 1997.
The dramatic growth in shareholder payout rates in
1997 continued a trend of increasing rates going back to
the early 1990s (Chart 4, solid line). Much of this growth
was fueled by the twenty-five largest bank holding com-
panies’ increased reliance on stock repurchases to return
earnings to shareholders (Chart 4, dotted line). Net stock
repurchases were positive and growing after 1993, indi-
cating that the repurchases were acting to reduce the
amount of equity capital outstanding for these companies
(all else equal). In contrast, the average dividend payout
ratio held fairly constant over this period (Chart 4, dashed
line). The combined result of these two trends is that stock
repurchases exceeded dividend payments during 1997.
Is There Reason for Concern?
The fact that aggregate shareholder payouts represent
such a large portion of bank holding companies’ net
income could give rise to concerns about banking insti-
tutions’ future capital positions. Specifically, if bank
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Chart 3
Components of the 1997 Change in Large Bank Holding
Companies’ Equity Capital Positions
Source:  Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, “Consolidated 
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Notes: Data are for the twenty-five largest U.S. bank holding companies at the
end of 1997 (with assets of $45 billion or more at that time). Year-end equity
capital levels for 1996 have been adjusted to control for mergers.
Chart 4
Large Bank Holding Companies’ Total Shareholder
Payouts, Dividends, and Net Stock Repurchases
as a Percentage of Net Income
Source:  Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, “Consolidated 















Notes:  Data are for the twenty-five largest U.S. bank holding companies in each
year. Total shareholder payouts equal dividends plus net stock repurchases. No
adjustments have been made to control for mergers.holding companies were locked in to a high dollar level
of payouts, then a future decline in earnings could drain
capital resources. Such a drain could occur if these
institutions were unable or unwilling to respond quickly
to a decline in earnings, so that the reduction in payouts
followed the earnings decline only with a lag.
To assess the importance of this concern, we need to
place these developments in their proper context. U.S.
banking companies have experienced several consecutive
years of strong earnings and healthy capital ratios. In this
environment, if banking companies felt that they had
acquired sufficient capital to withstand potential future
losses during an industry down-cycle, they would then face
the issue of how to manage any additional accumulating
capital resources. One possibility would be for them to seek
out new investment opportunities and increase the scale or
riskiness of their activities. In capital ratio terms, banking
companies adopting this strategy would increase their risk-
weighted assets, which, as the table indicates, the companies
have done to some degree. However, identifying good
investment opportunities could become increasingly diffi-
cult in a market in which many banks were following this
strategy, and as a result, banks might have to take on riskier
exposures to obtain an adequate return on capital.
Our evidence suggests that bank holding companies
have, to a large extent, opted to pursue a different strategy.
Specifically, the increased rate of stock repurchases and
the steady rate of dividend payments are consistent with
the argument that banking companies are instead return-
ing earnings to shareholders.6 In theory, this strategy is
economically efficient, since shareholders should prefer
this approach to the alternative of having a bank take on
excessively risky exposures.7
What, then, are the implications of the payout strategy
if future bank earnings declined significantly? The role of
stock repurchases in the recent growth of shareholder
payout rates is an important factor in answering this ques-
tion. As noted earlier, nearly all of this growth can be
attributed to the impact of stock repurchases. Compared
with dividend payments, stock repurchases generally pro-
vide bank holding companies with more flexibility to
adjust shareholder payments over time in response to fluc-
tuations in earnings. Bank holding companies (and other
firms) tend to change dividend rates only infrequently,
because such changes are often seen by investors as an
indication of the private information that companies have
about their future earning prospects. Thus, banking com-
panies may be reluctant to reduce dividends in the face of
a drop in earnings, either because they are unsure if the
drop is just a temporary phenomenon or because they are
concerned about sending a negative signal to the markets
about their long-run profitability.
In contrast, banking companies have considerably
more leeway to alter stock repurchases in response to
fluctuations in profitability—in large part because the
markets are much less sensitive to such actions. As Chart 4
makes clear, stock repurchases exhibited significantly
more movement over the 1990s banking industry cycle
than did dividend payments. This cyclical response to the
rise and fall of profits was reinforced by Federal Reserve
System regulations requiring bank holding companies to
receive supervisory approval before making large stock
repurchases. Because stock repurchases affect regulatory
capital, the Federal Reserve prohibits companies from
making repurchases that would threaten their ability to
meet capital adequacy standards.
The greater responsiveness of stock repurchases to
changes in earnings suggests that the current high rate of
shareholder payouts is not a strong signal of future capital
constraints on banking institutions. If bank earnings were
to drop significantly—perhaps because of a credit cycle
downturn or losses in a particular lending sector—banks’
flexibility to alter stock repurchases would provide a con-
siderable cushion before equity holdings were affected.
Specifically, because stock repurchases represented con-
siderably more than half of their net income in 1997
(Chart 4), banking companies could eliminate these trans-
actions and not experience a decline in equity capital until
earnings fell by more than 70 percent. This calculation
assumes that all other elements in the capital accumula-
tion process remain constant, which might not be true in a
real cyclical downturn. Nonetheless, the calculation sug-
gests that banks’ high shareholder payout rates are not a
cause for immediate concern.
Conclusion
The noticeable decline in capital ratios of U.S. bank
holding companies in 1997 could cast doubt on these
institutions’ future capital strength. Our analysis, how-
ever, indicates that concerns of this type may be prema-
ture. We find that the drop in ratios is attributable
largely to bank holding companies’ efforts to manage
their capital positions by returning earnings to share-
holders, rather than to an unusually large rise in risk-
weighted exposures. Following a period of strong, sus-
tained profitability, the twenty-five largest U.S. bank
holding companies sharply increased their payouts to
shareholders in 1997, in the form of dividend payments
and stock repurchases. Significantly, most of this
increase resulted from a surge in stock repurchases, which
provide banking companies with greater short-term flexi-
bility than dividends do. Should the companies’ future
income deteriorate, the repurchases would provide a large
cushion before equity holdings were affected.
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Notes
1. See Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (1997,
pp. 33-65, 77-8) for full definitions of tier 1 and total capital, as well
as descriptions of the various regulatory capital ratios.
2. As of June 1998, bank holding companies that have been
assigned the highest supervisory rating or that have adopted the cap-
ital requirements for market risk exposures have a minimum lever-
age ratio requirement of  3 percent. All other bank holding compa-
nies have a requirement of  4 percent. See Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System (1998) for more details.
3. Except where noted, pre-1997 data for the twenty-five largest
banking companies have been adjusted to control for the impact of
bank mergers. Because of data limitations, nonbank mergers (such
as acquisitions of nonbank subsidiaries other than those acquired
through bank holding company mergers) have not been included in
the adjustments. The results of the analysis are not significantly
affected by these adjustments.
Comparisons of 1996 and 1997 risk-based capital ratios may be
affected by the impact of the capital requirements for market risk,
which banks and bank holding companies had the option of adopt-
ing during 1997. Three very large bank holding companies chose to
do so. While it is difficult to estimate precisely the impact of the
market risk requirements on the tier 1 and total capital ratios,
approximations indicate that the impact may be fairly small (see
Hendricks and Hirtle [1997]). In any case, the ratios for these three
institutions do not appear to be driving the overall results. 
4. Similar relationships exist for the tier 1 capital ratio and the lever-
age ratio. The regression results indicate that these relationships are
statistically significant for the total capital and tier 1 capital ratios,
though not for the leverage ratio. These regressions omit one outlier
observation for which the total and tier 1 capital ratios far exceed the
corresponding ratios for the remaining twenty-four bank holding
companies. If the outlier is included in the regression, the negative
relationship remains, but it is not statistically significant.
5. Equity capital includes some preferred stock instruments and
other elements (such as unrealized gains on available-for-sale secu-
rities) excluded from tier 1 capital, while tier 1 capital includes
some elements (such as minority interests in consolidated sub-
sidiaries) not included in equity capital. Overall, however, the basic
elements of the two capital concepts—common stock plus sur-
plus—are the same. 
6. Of course, it is possible that these companies increased their risk
profiles in ways that did not raise risk-weighted assets. For instance,
they could have increased the riskiness of their assets within a risk
category or taken on positions that do not accrue a regulatory capi-
tal charge commensurate with their actual risk exposures. Our data
do not allow us to identify such increases in risk exposure. Thus it is
entirely possible that bank holding companies both increased pay-
outs to shareholders and took on riskier exposures during 1997. If
so, the decline in regulatory capital ratios could prove considerably
more troublesome.
7. See Jensen (1986) for a discussion of the incentives that might
lead firm managers to misinvest “free cash flow.”
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